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Red flags such as unusual sender domains or grammatical and spelling errors are also a sign that the email is malicious in nature, or at the very least, should be approached with proper security protocols in mind. Users should always be wary and avoid clicking on any link or downloading any file from unsolicited emails or suspicious sources. Therefore, it’s highly likely that Confucius will continue to experiment and try out different kinds of social engineering lures in future campaigns.ĭespite the variety of lures used by the threat actor, best security practices still apply to these attacks.
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While the code quality of its payloads is not of the highest standard, this threat actor uses innovative techniques when crafting its malicious documents, such as hiding malicious code in the comments section, or using encrypted documents to prevent automatic analysis. In our previous research, we already found Confucius, which is known for targeting Pakistan military for espionage purposes, employing multiple file stealers.
#TRADESTATION APP STORE PEGASUS HOW TO#
The creative use of social engineering lures and how to defend against them We disclosed multiple links between Patchwork and Confucius threat actors in the past, so this came as no surprise to us. It should be noted that in some occasions, the threat actor sent spear-phishing emails from the domain name mailerservicedirectory which we attributed to the Patchwork threat actor in previous research. Instead of exfiltrating the files through PHP scripts, they were done via FTP server. However, the second stage contained the final payload, which was once again a file stealer with the exact same structure (a. The first stage was also hidden in the “Comments” section.
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There were minor differences in tools, tactics, and procedures: the malicious document was directly attached to the spear phishing email - still encrypted - and the decryption password was sent in a different email. The sender address impersonates a service similar to that on the first email lures used in an older campaign from April 2021 impersonated the Federal Board of Revenue. The sender address, which is spoofed, impersonates the PR wing of the Pakistani Armed Forces days later, a second email - purportedly a warning from a Pakistani military about the Pegasus spyware - containing a cutt.ly link to a malicious encrypted Word document and the password for decryption will be sent to the target. During the first phase, an email without a malicious payload containing content copied from a legitimate Pakistani newspaper’s article is sent to the target. In this blog entry, we take a look at the lures used by the malicious actor and provide a short analysis of the file stealer used in the campaign, which was launched in early August. The NSO Group’s spyware spurred a collaborative investigation that found that it was being used to target high-ranking individuals in 11 different countries. While investigating the Confucius threat actor, we found a recent spear phishing campaign that utilizes Pegasus spyware-related lures to entice victims into opening a malicious document downloading a file stealer.
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